Massachusetts Appellate Cases / Alimony
On this page we are compiling links to the full text of important Massachusetts Appellate Cases on Family Law and Divorce decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
These cases are for educational purpose only and should not be used for any official or legal purpose. Please consult official reports. Below you will be able to search for Massachusetts Appeals Court Slip Opinions and Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Slip Opinions relating to Alimony.
Alimony Cases in Massachusetts
Andrews v. Andrews,
27 Mass. App. Ct. 759 (1989): Judge treated husband’s military pension as “stream of income” to be used as a source of alimony for the wife instead of being a capital asset which would be equitably divided. The wife was subject to an indefinite medical prognosis therefore the court reasoned alimony would be more appropriate because it could be adjusted up and down whereas equitable division could not be altered to meet the wife’s changing circumstances.
Barron v. Puzo,
415 Mass. 54 (1993): Fourteen years after former husband’s made his final payment of alimony, the former wife filed complaint for modification seeking a new order for payment of alimony. The former husband died shortly after the complaint was filed. The court held that the wife’s complaint did not survive the husband’s death and was denied because alimony that had been ordered was limited and fixed, and husband had paid in full to the explicit satisfaction of the divorce decree.
Bernier v. Bernier,
449 Mass. 774 (2007): Trial court did not abuse its discretion in this divorce action when it awarded the wife $275,000 per year in alimony as well as an additional $3,160.11 per week to cover the expenses of a horse farm which was awarded to the wife until the husband paid the wife in full for her interest in the parties S-corporations.
Bercume v. Bercume, 428 Mass. 635 (1999):
Bertocchi v. Ross,
50 Mass. App. Ct. 77 (2000): The trial court may not order in a divorce judgment that an award of alimony to the wife will terminate upon the husband reaching the age of 65. The court may not order the termination of alimony on the occurrence of an event unrelated to the recipient’s need for alimony or the supporting spouse’s ability to pay.
Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265 (1987):
Brady v. Brady, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 43 (1979):
Braun v. Braun, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 846 (2007):
Britton v. Britton,
69 Mass. App. Ct. 23 (2007): Husband appeals trial courts order that 40% of his income be paid to wife as alimony stating that the order is an “irrational alimony figure.” Appeals court found no abuse of discretion where husband was left with an income that was $20,000 more than the amount the wife would receive in alimony. The main goal of alimony is to restore the dependent spouse to an economic style close to what was enjoyed during the marriage. That standard however should not limit the amount of alimony based on a spouse’s need.
Broome v. Broome, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 539 (1997):
C.D.L. vs. M.M.L., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 146 (2008):
Cherrington v. Cherrington,
404 Mass. 267 (1989): The former wife requested modification of her divorce judgment seeking an increase of child support payments, and alimony. The court held that: 1) the wife’s request for alimony after a divorce judgment should have been filed as a unique complaint, separate from one for modification of judgment, 2) former wife should not be required to show material change in circumstance when request for alimony when the request is treated as a request for original award, and 3) the record did not indicate that the judge considered all the statutory factors when alimony was determined.
Cohan v. Feuer, 442 Mass. 151 (2004):
The general rule is that the payment of alimony terminates when the obligor spouse dies or the obligee remarries, “unless either (1) the original decree on agreement provides otherwise or the parties legally amend their agreement to provide otherwise, or (2) in the case of the obligor’s death, the court makes written findings establishing that termination of the award would work a substantial injustice because of facts not present in most cases.
Cooper v. Cooper, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 130 (2004):
A judge’s finding did support its order to modify alimony in excess of the terms of the original divorce judgment. Thus; its judgment was vacated as to the alimony order that was in excess of the original divorce judgment, unless a judge found that “the husband’s income was of such magnitude as to be well in excess of adjustments to income reasonably anticipated by the parties’ separation agreement and that the agreement’s provisions for support and property were inadequate to maintain the wife in the standard of living enjoyed by the parties while married.”
Daugherty v. Daugherty, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 738 (2001):
At the 1995 trial of a postdivorce complaint for property division and alimony, the judge should have awarded the wife her share, plus the subsequent market appreciation of that share, of the husband's pension and profit sharing fund based on its value in 1995, when the parties separated and the marital partnership effectively ended. In a post divorce proceeding for alimony, the judge did not abuse his discretion in the amount of the alimony award.
D.L. v. G.L.,
61 Mass. App. Ct. 488 (2004): T he Appeals Court upheld the trial court's decision not to assign the interests of the husband in various family trusts, ruling that the husband's acquisition of the assets of the trusts was not fairly certain. However, the trial court could and did consider the trusts in relation to his opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and to the extent he had present discretionary interests in income from trusts could consider them as streams of income for purpose of setting alimony and child support. But alimony cannot be time limited based merely on the potential for the wife to receive a substantial inheritance at some indefinite future date.
Downey v. Downey, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 812 (2002): In an action for modification of a judgment of divorce nisi, the judge awarded alimony to the former wife, taking into account the fact that the loss of child support income upon the emancipation of the divorced couple's youngest child constituted a material change of circumstances, and also considered the history of the proceedings and other relevant circumstances of the parties. He concluded that the wife's resources were not sufficient for her support. The judge ordered the former husband to pay the former wife's attorney's fees, where the judge considered all relevant factors, including the husband's obstructionist conduct which prolonged the proceedings and caused the wife's counsel to engage in extraordinary discovery efforts.
Dwight v. Dwight,
52 Mass. App. Ct. 739 (2001): Ex-wife brought a complaint under the terms of her separation agreement which survived the divorce judgment. The court awarded the wife $2,600.00 per month in alimony, of which the Husband appealed. The court held that the Husband received a “substantial inheritance” which provided the Husband with an increased income which justified the higher alimony award. The court also held that there was a material change in circumstance which warranted the Wife to seek alimony.
Flannery v. Flannery, 429 Mass. 55 (1999):
A claim for alimony payments under a support agreement against the estate of the deceased former husband more than five years after his death but before the estate was fully administered, was barred by the one-year limitations period set forth in G. L. c. 197, s. 9 (a), with respect to payments that accrued during the one-year period after the former husband's death, but not with respect to payments that accrued thereafter.
Goldman v. Goldman,
28 Mass. App. Ct. 603 (1990): Wife sued from order entered on remand which awarded alimony and property division. The Appeals Court overturned the Trial Courts order of alimony, finding that it was too low of an amount of support and it should not have been limited to only and eight year period.
Gordon v. Gordon,
26 Mass. App. Ct. 973 (1988): The divorced Husband appealed judgment nisi granting him rehabilitative instead of permanent alimony. The Appeals Court held that the Husband was capable of earning income but the alimony order was not immune from modification if the Husbands predicted future employment failed to materialize.
Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 397 Mass. 617 (1986) *(Abrogation Overturned by Keller v. O'Brien, 425 Mass. 774, 777 (1997).)*:
Court that a provision in a divorce judgment which terminated the Husband’s alimony obligation when the Wife began to cohabitate with another person, was beyond the court’s discretion.
Greenberg v. Greenberg, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 344 (2007):
Complaint for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on July 24, 1992. Neither the findings nor the uncontroverted evidence support the conclusion that there was a change in the parties' circumstances justifying a downward modification in Frederic's alimony obligation. Frederic's request for double costs and attorney's fees related to this appeal is denied.
Grubert v. Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811 (1985):
When awarding alimony to a spouse, the “need” of a spouse is determined by “the ‘station’ of the parties --- by what is required to maintain a standard of living comparable to the one enjoyed during the marriage.”
Harris v. Harris, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 931 (1986): Appeal from a modification judgment ordering that the husband's alimony obligation continues at specific rates until it is eliminated. The wife claims that the husband failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating that the parties have experienced a material change in their circumstances, let alone a "more than a material change" standard (Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510 , 515 [1982]), which she argues was required to warrant a modification of the divorce judgment. She also argues that the court made erroneous findings of fact and failed to consider all of the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, Section 34, prior to entering the modification judgment.
Heins v. Ledis, 422 Mass. 477 (1996):
Discussion of the authority of a Probate and Family Court judge to award alimony and to make an equitable division of marital property. Also discussion of the distinctions between the concepts of alimony and property division. A probate judge incorrectly awarded alimony to the wife in part to reimburse the wife for her lost investment in the husband's business, and the award was improper without a determination of the wife's financial need or her potential earning capacity.
Heistand v. Heistand,
384 Mass. 20 (1981): Ex-husband appealed decision which held him in contempt and ordered upward modification of child support. Supreme Judicial Court held that 1) the Ex-husband was not entitled to reimbursement for alimony paid from date of ex-wife's so-called remarriage ceremony while she was still married to ex-husband to date of legal remarriage; 2) ex-wife was entitled to upward modification of child support because there was a material change in circumstance which was an increase in the Ex-husband’s salary; 3) trial court did not abuse discretion in permitting ex-wife's late amendment of modification complaint; and 4) ex-husband was not entitled to offset amount from weekly payments to ex-wife under divorce judgment in order to collect money due for tax liability of ex-wife because “the sums paid to the plaintiff might well be considered income in the ordinary use of the word” and that, if both parties had filed separate returns for 1978, the alimony paid would be taxable income to the plaintiff.”
Huddleston v. Huddleston, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 563 (2001):
The parties were divorced in 1978, and their separation agreement was incorporated and merged into the judgment of divorce nisi. The parties' separation agreement stated that the husband would pay the wife "during the joint lives of the parties" or until the wife remarried. The separation agreement also made provisions for annual cost of living increases/adjustments. After the divorce the husband remarried but the wife did not. The parties' judgment of divorce was modified in 1985 and 1991. The former wife appeals from a 1998 modification judgment wherein the court terminated the former husband's alimony payments upon either party's death, the former wife's remarriage or the former husband turning 65 years old. In addition, the probate judge eliminated the husband's obligation to carry life insurance on his life and the cost of living adjustment. The appeals court reversed the trial court because the judgment was contrary to the parties' intent that the husband pay the wife alimony regardless of his age or retirement status. Furthermore, based on the terms of the parties' separation agreement, there are no findings that state the former husband's alimony payment of $3,385.34/month was unduly burdensome to him or that the cost-of-living adjustments should be eliminated. Based on the facts of this case, there were no material change in circumstances in which a modification was warranted.
J.D.H. v. P.A.H., 71 Mass. App. Ct. 285 (2008):
Katz v. Katz, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 472 (2002):
In a proceeding for modification of alimony, the Probate Court judge abused her discretion terminating the husband's alimony obligation without appropriate consideration of all the relevant circumstances. The evidence established the existence of assets that were available to the husband to pay some level of support without impoverishing him. The record established that is the wife did not receive any alimony she would be reduced to poverty.
Kehoe v. Kehoe,
31 Mass. App. Ct. 958 (1992): An award of $14,300 per year is improper where the parties were married for 23 ½ years and where the parties attained an affluent lifestyle. The dependent spouse is entitled to an award of alimony which will provide her with a standard of living that is comparable to that which she enjoyed during the marriage. It is also appropriate for the judge to consider the potential, instead of the actual, earnings of a spouse when determining an award of alimony.
Keller v. O Brien, 420 Mass. 820 (1995): Discussion involving the termination of alimony in the case of remarriage. Remarriage does not automatically terminate alimony, but rather requires a court to terminate alimony unless the recipient spouse demonstrates extraordinary circumstances warranting its continuation. Husband´s alimony was terminated.
Keller v. O´Brian, 425 Mass. 774 (1997): Postjudgment divorce proceeding where a the husband was not entitled to restitution of alimony payments made to the wife after her remarriage where it would be inequitable in the circumstances; the court determined that the rule announced in Keller v. O'Brien, 420 Mass. 820 (1995), would not be applied retroactively to this case. LYNCH, J., dissenting.
Kelley v. Kelley, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 733 (2005):
Complaint for divorce filed in the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on May 7, 1999. The portions of the judgment dated November 28, 2003, that reduce the alimony award to the wife and deny her request for attorney's and expert's fees and costs in connection with the proceedings below are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Probate Court for a determination of the amount of those fees and costs. The wife has requested her attorney's fees and costs in connection with this appeal. She "may . . . submit [her] petition for [appellate] fees together with the necessary back-up material and details as to hours spent, precise nature of the work, and fees requested," Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 20 (1989), to this court within fifteen days of the issuance of the rescript in this case. See Larson v. Larson, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 343, 344.
Kernan v. Morse, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 378 (2007): The parties were divorced in 1999. There were two children of the marriage. At the time of the divorce, the husband was earning approximately $300,000 , and the wife was a fulltime homemaker and primary caretaker of the children. Although the wife did not work, she was receiving unearned annual income of approximately $83,000 from family trusts. Under the divorce judgment, the parties shared joint legal custody, and the wife had primary physical custody of the daughter and the husband had primary physical custoday of the son. The husband was ordered to pay the wife $500 per week in child support and $500 per week in alimony. In 2003, the husband filed a complaint for modification to reduce his support because he had lost his job in 2002 (his only source of income was unemployment, even though the value of his assets increased), and his daughter resided equally with the parties. In addition, the wife's unearned annual income from family trusts increased to $123,026, and the value of her assets increased, too. The wife filed a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit of undisputed facts, stating that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The wife's motion was allowed by the judge, and the husband's complaint for modification was dismissed. The husband appealed. The judge erred when he only considered the husband's "technical ability to pay" without consideration of the changed circumstances regarding wife's need for support. There is a triable issue regarding the wife's need for continued support from the husband because of her increase in income and assets, and fact that the daughter is residing equally with the parties. These circumstances, together with the husband's financial circumstances, are all relevant, and must be considered together. This judgment was reversed and remanded back to the probate court.
Larson v. Larson, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 106 (1994):
An alimony provision in a separation agreement survived the judgment of divorce with independent significance. The husband must pay a percentage of his earned income as alimony and must also provide a reasonable amount of alimony. The husband had decided on his own to retire in good health from a successful career some years before his normal retirement age and thus stopped earning income, without having made some other provision for his former wife's support.
Levenson v. Feuer, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 428 (2004):
Lombardi v. Lombardi, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 407 (2007):
Lynch v. Lynch,
5 Mass. App. Ct. 167 (1977): The Appeals Court held that the fact that the Husband went above and beyond the requirements of the divorce judgment, does not obviate necessity of reviewing the Trial Court Judge’s failure to award alimony for the Ex-wife.
Mansur v. Clark, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 618 (1988):
A Probate Court judge correctly dismissed a wife's complaint for contempt alleging that her former husband had failed to meet his alimony obligation, where the husband's obligation to pay alimony arose exclusively from the parties' separation agreement and was not the subject of a court order. The Probate Court judge correctly dismissed a husband's complaint seeking modification of his alimony obligation where, in the absence of any court order relative to alimony, the husband's effort to achieve modification was directed to the alimony obligation imposed by the parties' separation agreement itself.
O´Brien v. O´Brien, 416 Mass. 477 (1993): A former wife was seeking modification of a support order entered against a former husband. She was receiving public assistance and since the husband was capable of contributing to her support, the judge correctly concluded that he should award support to the wife against the husband only to the extent necessary to remove her from public assistance; moreover, the judge's order concerning the husband's payment of uninsured medical expenses of the wife was reasonable, and the amount of attorney's fees awarded after a hearing was properly within the judge's discretion. On appeal from dismissal of a claim for support made by a former wife against the second of her three former husbands. The second husband's obligation to support his former wife ended when she married her third husband was a correct application of the general principle governing this case that, when a successor spouse is financially able to support the former recipient spouse, the former payor spouse is not obliged to contribute support payments (in the absence of an agreement to the contrary).
Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 78 (1991):
In the circumstances of this court's remand of a divorce action for a new trial on the issue of a change in the support obligation owed by the husband, the judgment dismissing the wife's counterclaim was also reversed and the question of the payment of additional attorney's fees to the wife was also remanded for reconsideration. The judge properly dismissed a complaint for contempt seeking to compel payment for certain expenses that were not part of the support obligation ordered by the court.
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 285 (2009):
Review of the evolution of the law of alimony, which is wholly statutory, and discussion of the factors that a judge must take into consideration in making an award of alimony (or a modification of an award) and the balance that a judge must strike when financial resources are inadequate to maintain the marital standard of living.
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 903 (1992):
In high asset case, involving a long term marriage, the wife received $4,000,000 in cash and other assets equivalent to approximately 30 percent of a marital estate worth $22,000,000. The court approved a judgment awarding $2000 per week alimony in addition to this property settlement.
Rosenblatt v. Rosenblatt,
39 Mass. App. Ct. 297 (1995): The Appeals Court held that even though the Wife signed the antenuptial agreement the night before they were to leave for their wedding and the signature was not initially notarized, it was valid as to property division.
Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 366 (2004): The alimony award was vacated and the issue of property division was remanded for reconsideration because the probate judge’s order left the wife in “economically strained circumstances while [the husband was] guaranteed continued enjoyment of the secure, comfortable marital lifestyle.”
Schillander v. Schillander, 307 Mass. 96 (1940): Petition to modify support for wife and child was dismissed because Husband and Wife had an agreement independent of decree of alimony in divorce suit and in absence of statutory authority the court cannot change the support amount based on the Husband’s petition because of changed conditions.
Thomsen v. Thomsen, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 1010 (1981): Ex-husband appealed from modification judgment that increased his alimony obligation to his ex-wife. The appeals court upheld the trial courts order because the court found that the ex-husband had been living an extravagant life while the ex-wife had not been able to due to her poor financial situation.
Vakil v. Vakil, 450 Mass. 411 (2008):
Wooters v. Wooters, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 929 (1997): Husband appeals Trial Courts order of alimony and Appeals Court held that alimony could be awarded based on percentage of Husband’s income and the Husband was required to maintain life insurance and medical insurance even after the wife remarried.
Yousif v. Yousif, 61 Mass. 411 (2008):
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