Massachusetts Appellate Cases / Child Support
On this page we are compiling links to the full text of important Massachusetts Appellate Cases on Family Law and Divorce decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
These cases are for educational purpose only and should not be used for any official or legal purpose. Please consult official reports. Below you will be able to search for Massachusetts Appeals Court Slip Opinions and Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Slip Opinions relating to Child Support.
Child Support Cases in Massachusetts
Ames v. Perry, 406 Mass. 236 (1989):
Upon petition by the wife to modify the separation agreement to provide additional support, the court was correct to deny the motion because the wife failed to demonstrate that there was “something more than a material change of circumstances” justifying the need for modification.
Braun vs. Braun,
68 Mass. App. Ct. 846 (2007): Order requiring parents to share equally in the college expenses of the minor child was found invalid because the children were still young and absent special circumstances, it was premature to make this determination.
Brooks v. Piela,
61 Mass. App. Ct. 731 (2004): In a modification action for child support the probate judge did not abuse her discretion by considering the non-custodial parent’s enhanced income and the disparity of the standard of living in each household, where the judge considered the children’s needs and stipulated evidence that the children’s ages and their increased expenses justified an increase in child support.
Canning v. Juskalian,
33 Mass. App. Ct. 202 (1991): Court held that earning capacity instead of the parties actual income should be considered in determining child support. Also excessive and expensive travel expenses can be considered in a support order even though it is outside of the scope of the child support guidelines.
Clark v. Barba,
37 Mass. App. Ct. 322 (1994): Probate court has jurisdiction to modify a child support order even after the death of one of one of the spouses.
Croak v. Bergeron,
67 Mass. App. Ct. 750 (2006): Court can deny request for modification of a child support order where the requesting party has voluntarily remained unemployed. That party will not receive a reduction in support obligations. Also, the Husband’s IRA could be treated as income and divisible property where the Husband used the IRA funds as replacement for earnings and for his own support while he was unemployed. Not treating the IRA as income would be inequitable.
Crowe vs. Fong,
45 Mass. App. Ct. 673 (1998): The court can modify a child support order upon a showing of a discrepancy of 20% or more between an established order and a proposed new order calculated under the child support guidelines. However, when the discrepancy is the result of a separation agreement of the parties then the party seeking the modification must show a material change in circumstances.
DeCristofaro v. DeCristofaro, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 231 (1987): Where parties intend a separation agreement to survive the divorce judgment, it will continue to exist as an independent enforceable agreement even if the language in the divorce judgment provided that "agreement be incorporated and merged in judgment of divorce nisi."
Department of Revenue v. Foss, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 452 (1998): A modification of a child support order, which increased the father's support obligation but deviated substantially from the Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines, was not supported by sufficient reasons or specific findings to have warranted a departure from the guidelines; the judgment of modification was vacated. In a proceeding for modification of a child support order, the Probate Court judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to make the increased support order retroactive to the date of service of the complaint, where the evidence did not support the mother's claim that the father deliberately delayed the proceedings in order to avoid an increased support obligation, nor did the judge abuse his discretion in ordering the parties to alternately claim the dependent child tax exemption.
Department of Revenue v. Roe (1) , 29 Mass. App. Ct. 967 (1990): In paternity cases, pursuant to M.G.L.A. c. 209C, § 9, courts have the authority to order retroactive child support for this period from the birth of the child to the entry of the order. Also, the father of a child born out of wedlock does have standing to challenge the order.
Department of Revenue v. Roe (2), 31 Mass. App. Ct. 924 (1991): In paternity cases, pursuant to M.G.L.A. c. 209C, § 9, courts have the authority to order retroactive child support for this period from the birth of the child to the entry of the order. Retroactive payments can be imposed for period preceding the effective date of the statute and are not in violation of ex post facto laws.
Department of Revenue v. G.W.A, 412 Mass. 435 (1992): Where a judge determines based on the child support guidelines, an amount that would not be just or is inappropriately high, the judge can in his discretion, reduce the support to an amount that is equitable.
Donovan v. Donovan, 15 Mass.App.Ct 61 (1982): Worker's compensation benefits can be assigned for payment of alimony and child support.
Draper v. Burke, 450 Mass. 676 (2008): Once one court enters a child support order, no other court may modify that order as long as the obligee, obligor, or child continues to reside within the jurisdiction that executed the order, unless each party consents in writing to another jurisdiction.
Eccleston vs. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428 (2003): The court concluded that a Probate Court judge lacked authority to order a divorced father to pay support after a child's eighteenth birthday to a third party appointed as his child's guardian and with whom his child was domiciled. The court concluded that a Probate Court judge had the authority pursuant to equity powers vested by the Legislature to impose a postminority support order on a child's financially able noncustodial parent or parents, insofar as the child was found not to be emancipated.
Flaherty v. Flaherty, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 289 (1996): Child support order cannot be based on father's full time income where he was laid-off shortly before the divorce trial and was unemployed at the time of trial provided there is no evidence that the father's change in job status was voluntary.
Halpern v. Rabb,
75 Mass. App. Ct. 331 (2009): Wife filed contempt against husband for failing to pay child support obligation. Court held that the pass-through income of a corporation could not be included in the husband’s income in the case where the husband did not retain the income. However in this case, the Appeals court held that there were insufficient findings to know whether the husband retained the pass-through income. Case was remanded in part to determine these facts.
Hamilton v. Pappalardo, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 471 (1997): Support of child with special needs creates a special circumstance where the separation agreement need only mention the anticipation, rather than the specific needs for the child. Upon such an instance, where modification of an agreement is sought to increase support for a child with special needs, the court will enforce the original agreement but the decision will also be determined by considerations of equity and fairness to be setting in an equitable jurisdiction.
Hartog v. Hartog, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 124 (1989): In a complaint for modification, one of the parties' four children had developed a mental illness since the divorce judgment, and the youngest child, age nine, appeared to be at risk of developing the same disorder. The wife had been allowed the exclusive right to occupy the marital home for two years but the period was now extended an additional eight years. This provision was construed as one for child support, and a material change in circumstances required such a modification in the best interest of the parties' nine year old child living with the mother.
Katzman vs. Healy,
77 Mass. App. Ct. 589 (2010): The court did not err in retroactively applying the increase to child support to the date of the notice of filing for modification because the parties, through a separation agreement, agreed that child support would be revisited every three years. Therefore, the court was correct in only retroactively applying the modification order back three years. Increasing the husband’s support obligation was not an abuse of discretion because the parties agreed to re-evaluate the support order every three years and in the last three, the husband’s income more than doubled.
K.B. v. D.B., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 265 (1994): A husband had voluntarily supported a child, born to his wife during their marriage but fathered by another man, prior to learning conclusively that he was not the father. The judge did not err in concluding that the husband was not estopped to raise the defense of nonpaternity.
Kirwood v. Kirwood, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1156 (1989): To continue to receive child support after a child turns 18, there must be evidence that the child is primarily dependant for maintenance from the parent. Where the supportor is paying for the child's college tuition and room and board at school, that child is not dependant for maintenance from the supportee parent.
Langerman v. Langerman, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 869 (1980): Where neither party in their divorce action, introduced any evidence regarding the effect of inflation or income taxes would have on the alimony or child support award, the trial judge is not required to consider such consequences and cannot be held in error.
Larson v. Larson, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 338 (1990): Parent who is order to pay support to the other parent for the care of their child, the obligor parent cannot arbitrarily reduce alimony and support payments once the child turns 18 years old, rather he must seek a modification of the order. Where the length of the term for support is in doubt because of the language in the agreement, the court will place itself in the position of the parties and will examine the subject matter of the agreement and will attempt to ascertain the object that was intended by the parties.
Leonardo v. Leonardo, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 572 (1996): A probate judge ordered the husband to pay a certain amount per week in child support for the care and maintenance of his five minor children that was more than the amount calculated under the child support guidelines.
LoStracco v. LoStracco, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (1992): Child support provisions allowed the wife to have the use and occupancy of the marital home, but required that the home be sold in the event of her remarriage and the proceeds divided between the parties. The court concluded that the condition requiring sale of the house could not stand in view of the judge's stated objective of providing stability of the home environment of the parties' children; the issue of sale was to be left to modification proceedings should a change in the parties' circumstances occur.
L.W.K. v. E.R.C, 432 Mass. 438 (2000): Child support case involving the obligor's death. The court concluded that a child support order should be modified to credit to the father's estate, now the obligor, the amount of Social Security death benefits that the child, as a qualified minor, was entitled to receive based on the father's participation in the Social Security system. A judge in the Probate and Family Court did not have authority to enter an order to secure postminority educational support by setting aside a lump sum in trust from the estate of the child's deceased father, where the child did not presently qualify for such support.
Martin v. Martin, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 547 (2007): The Supplemental Security Insurance benefits that a disabled child receives shall not be included in a determination of child support obligation for any other child.
Naranjo v. Naranjo, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 256 (2005): Judgment which incorporated agreement between the parties that the father owed no past child support because he was incarcerated thus unemployed, was held to be a proper retroactive modification.
O’Meara v. Doherty, 53. Mass. App. Ct. 599 (2002): The wife was not estopped from seeking child support 17 years after the child was born out of wedlock and after the father had married another woman. The fact that the wife waited 17 years for support would be considered in determining past accrued support, especially because the father was unaware of the his paternity.
Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. 52 (1998): Generally support orders regarding future payment of post-high school education costs should not be made in connection with a divorce action. The court has narrow discretion when deemed appropriate to create a trust fund for children's future post-high school education. Typically available where both parties express concern for post-high school education and where there is evidence of reckless economic and social behavior of the part of either or both parents.
Poras v. Pauling,
70 Mass. App. Ct. 535 (2007): Wife filed contempt against husband for failure to pay child support obligation. Court found that husband was “presently unable to pay the arrears” and that the judgment in the contempt action contained no provision for attorney fees and expenses. The court held that to find a person in civil contempt, the court must be able to find that the defendant had the ability to pay at the time the contempt judgment was entered.
Richardson v. Department of Revenue, 423 Mass. 378 (1996): A person who voluntarily acknowledges his paternity, and agrees to pay child support is not entitled to recover child support payments when it was determined that he was not the father nine (9) years later.
Rosenberg v. Merida, 428 Mass. 182 (1998): Where a noncustodial parent receives Social Security disability income (SSDI) dependency benefits, under the Massachusetts child support guidelines that amount is attributable as income to that parent for computation of child support, and that parent is then entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit equal to the amount of the SSDI dependency benefits against the support obligation; however, a parent, in order to apply the credit, must file a complaint for modification of the child support obligation or otherwise seek approval of a judge. in this case the judge made no findings relating to the amount of the support obligation or relating to his award of sole legal custody of the minor child to the mother. Case was remanded. The assets of the father were attached in the amount of $60,000, to secure his child support obligation and for potential contribution to the minor child's college education expenses.
Ruml v. Ruml, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 500 (2000): The Husband was properly held in contempt for failure to pay child support obligation where the Husband had claimed he was unable to get work because he intentionally restricted his job search to low-income jobs out of state.
Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366 (1981): The husband filed a Complaint for Modification to reduce his support obligations because he had a substantial reduction in income. The Court refused to reduce his support payments because with the exception of one job interview, he was not attempting to obtain other employment. Therefore the court held that this voluntary under/unemployment was not "a material change in circumstances" sufficient for modification of support.
Smith v. Edelman, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 549 (2007): Increase in the Husband's income after the divorce judgment was not sufficient to warrant a modification in the support order because the Husband's increase in income did not result is a material disparity in the standard of living of the two different households.
Silvia v. Silvia, 9 Mass.App.Ct 339 (1980): The income or assets of a second spouse can be considered by the court in awarding child support because the existence of these assets or income effects the ability of parents to use their own resources to pay child support.
Stolk vs. Stolk,
31 Mass. App. Ct. 903 (1991): *No longer good law, see Kauffman v. Kauffman, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 903 (1991)* Where a child resides in Massachusetts and his parents’ were divorce in another state, Massachusetts court has the power to make a judgment with regard to support of that minor child and can authorize support and payment of college education even if the other states law does not require such support.
White v. Laingor, 434 Mass. 64 (2001): An agreement that the mother will accept a reduced lump-sum payment for child support arrearages in exchange for the father's consent to adoption of the children by her new husband is unenforceable as a violation of public policy. Such an agreement requires a determination of the court as to what is in the best interest of the children.
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