Massachusetts Appellate Cases / Division of property
On this page we are compiling links to the full text of important Massachusetts Appellate Cases on Family Law and Divorce decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
These cases are for educational purpose only and should not be used for any official or legal purpose. Please consult official reports. Below you will be able to search for Massachusetts Appeals Court Slip Opinions and Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Slip Opinions relating to Division of Property.
Division of Property Cases in Massachusetts
Abegglen v. Abegglen The parties' separation agreement provided that the husband establish an estate plan to leave one-third of his estate in trust to the wife. The wife was afraid that one-third of his estate would not be available to her and she filed a civil action against her husband for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and later filed a motion to add a breach of fiduciary duty. The court found that the husband was not in breach of contract because anticipatory breach is not recognized in Massachusetts, and there were no facts to support the wife's claim for the breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The wife's motion was denied because a fiduciary relationship did not exist between the parties.
Adlakha v. Adlakha The parties were married in 1984, and the husband was employed as a nuclear engineer and the wife was a physician. For the majority of the marriage, the parties lived separately. Although the parties had some joint investment assets their finances were kept separate. In 1995, the husband voluntarily stopped working as a nuclear engineer and opened a jewelry kiosk. Since that time, the husband was underemployed, which the court later found. During this time, the wife's medical practice prospered. The court split the parties' assets in proportion to their contributions to the marriage. The proportional split of the marital estate was based on the factors set forth in G.L. c. 208, section 34, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the issue of property division.
Akinci-Unal v. Unal: The plaintiff, Feride Ela Akinci-Unal (the wife), appeals from a judgment entered by order of a judge of the Probate and Family Court dismissing her complaint for equitable distribution of assets and alimony, see G. L. c. 208, § 34. The dismissal followed, and was based on, the obtaining by the defendant, Gokhan Unal (the husband), of divorces pursuant to judgments entered in the countries of Bahrain and Turkey. In light of those foreign judgments of divorce, and on consideration of the parties' affidavits, the judge terminated the wife's proceeding in Massachusetts, concluding that the doctrine of comity required that the foreign judgments receive recognition; that the wife's action was barred by principles of res judicata; and that the court could not exert jurisdiction over the person of the husband in any event.
We conclude that the Massachusetts courts may permissibly exercise jurisdiction over the person of the husband. With respect to the husband's defense based on principles of res judicata, specifically claim preclusion, we hold that the wife's post divorce complaint under G. L. c. 208, § 34, is not barred because there has been no previous determination with respect to her economic claims. That being the case, the doctrine of comity is inapplicable. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in the trial court.
Arlington v. Mangiacotti A public employee is permitted by General laws to assign a portion of his pension interest pursuant to a marital separation agreement which was supported by a parallel court order for the division of marital assets.
Baccanti v. Morton: (2001) Leading Massachusetts case on the treatment of Stock Options in Divorce.
Bacon v. Bacon In a divorce action, there was no error in the judge's equitable, rather than an equal, division of property based on his appraisal of the parties' contributions, entitlements and realistic needs.
Belsky v. Belsky 9 Mass. App. 852 (1980)-Future inheritance can be taken into account when dividing assets in divorce.
Bianco v. Bianco 371 Mass. 420 (1976) Early case interpreting MGL Ch. 208 section 34 relating to division of assets.
Carpenter v. Carpenter Almost twenty years after the entry of a judgment of divorce nisi that provided that the parties' "marital property shall be divided with formula advanced by the husband, the wife filed a post divorce complaint seeking a division of the husband's municipal pension. A second judge presided at the trial on the post divorce complaint. The husband testified during the trial on the post divorce complaint that his pension was addressed during the division of the marital estate at the time of the divorce. The husband's testimony was credible but was not substantiated by any findings of fact made by the first judge or the record of the divorce proceedings, and he failed to sustain his burden of proof on his affirmative defense of res judicata. The wife was assigned forty percent of the marital coverture portion of the husband's pension. On the husband's appeal, the husband sustained his burden of proof and the judgment was reversed.
Child vs. Child
Collins v. Guggenheim A man cohabited with a woman for six years on a farm she owned and made financial contributions to the household and the farm's operations, but the parties never married, he was not entitled to receive an equitable interest in the farm or an accounting of monies received by the farm since the parties' mutual separation in 1986; nor was he entitled to a declaration that the farm was held in constructive trust for his benefit and an order compelling the woman to convey title to them both as tenants in common, where there was no basis for a finding of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or other misconduct.
Comins v. Comins In making a division of marital property, the judge in a divorce proceeding appropriately considered his findings, which were not plainly wrong, concerning the wife's allegations of abusive conduct by the husband. In the circumstances of a divorce proceeding, it was appropriate for the judge to allocate the wife's interest in the marital home to the husband.
Contributory Retirement Board of Arlington vs. Mangiacotti
Dalessio v. Dalessio 409 Mass. 821(1991) Case involving division of proceeds of personal injury claims in divorce.
Davidson v. Davidson 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364
deCastro vs. deCastro 415 Mass. 787 Division of Marital Property case involving an award to the wife of fifty per cent of the husband's interest in a successful publicly traded corporation of which he was a founder.
Denninger v. Denninger 34 Mass. App. Ct. 429 Case concerning a trial judge's obligations in determining a fair division of marital assets, and an appellate court's duty on review of a judgment pursuant to that statute. On appeal from a judgment of divorce awarding the husband fifteen percent of the marital assets of the parties, this court concluded that, in the circumstances, the judge gave excessive weight to the original source of the assets of the parties' twenty-seven year long marriage and failed to allocate assets in such fashion as would enable each party to sustain an approximation of the living standard each enjoyed while married to the other.
Dewan v. Dewan -1983 - 17 Mass. App. Ct. 97 — leading case on dividing pensions.
Dewan v. Dewan -1987 - In making an equitable division of marital property, it is within the judge's discretion to assign presently, as a property asset, a percentage of the present value of a party's future pension benefits or, alternatively, to allocate a percentage of the pension benefits attributable to the period of the marriage if and when they are received; however, this court expressed a preference for the former method as providing an immediate settlement and avoiding uncertainty. A divorce action was remanded for the judge to explain his reasons for making an apparently disproportionate division of marital property pursuant to G. L. c. 208, Section 34, where his original property judgment, before a previous remand, had made a more nearly equal allocation.
Dewan v. Dewan - 1991 - In a divorce action in which the present value of the husband's pension was allocated between the parties, the judge correctly declined to calculate the value on the assumption the wife would receive a survivor annuity; he appropriately considered the contemporaneous value of the other major marital asset, the marital residence; and he properly determined that each party pay his or her own counsel fees.
D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 488 (2004). The Husband’s interests in certain trusts were property excluded from the marital estate subject to property division pursuant to G.L.c. 208, § 34, and the Husband’s income from the trusts were treated as streams of income to establish alimony and child support orders.
Drapek v. Drapek: 399 Mass. 240 (1987). A spouse’s professional degree is not considered a marital asset subject to property division under G.L. c. 208, § 34. However, the spouse’s earning potential is considered when ordering alimony and property division.
Early v. Early The judge properly included the present value of the husband's public employee pension rights in the marital estate subject to division. He awarded marital assets and alimony to the wife that were neither plainly wrong nor excessive.
Early v. State Board of Retirement 420 Mass. 836. Public Employment, Retirement. Retirement. Divorce and Separation, Division of property.
Fechtor vs. Fechtor The judge supported his conclusion to make an approximately equal apportionment of the martial assets. There was no error in the judge's findings on the value of the parties' closely held securities business, and the improper exclusion of the husband's opinion of value was not reversible error. The party who offered no evidence on the tax impact of the apportionment of marital assets raised no issue on that point for decision on appeal; however, any undue adverse tax consequences might be alleviated by a motion to amend the judgment or to alter the judgment. No error appeared in a judge's award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife in a divorce action.
Gleed v. Noon
Gonzalez v. Pierce-Williams Petition filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on April 27, 2005.
Gustin v. Gustin, 420 Mass. 854 (1995). The parties were married in 1961, and separated in October 1992. A judgment of divorce was issued on October 26, 1993. The trial judge entered a judgment of divorce nisi and divided the marital property after consideration of the § 34 factors. The trial judge also ordered the parties to divide the personal property among them, and if the parties could not come to an agreement then they must submit to binding arbitration to remedy the dispute. G.L. c. 208, s. 34, confers on a judge the broad discretion in dividing the assets after consideration of the § 34 factors. However, the trial judge is not permitted to order the parties in a property dispute to submit to binding arbitration unless agreed upon by the parties. A trial judge may require the parties to submit their property dispute to a court appointed intermediary for recommendation purposes. However, only the trial judge has the authority to make a fair and equitable division of property, and must promulgate a final and binding disposition of property consistent with G.L. c. 208, § 34. Thus, a trial judge cannot delegate this responsibility by ordering the parties to binding arbitration. The Appeals Court vacated the order of the parties' submission to binding arbitration and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.
Hanify v. Hanify 403 Mass 184(1988) Pending lawsuits are marital assets and can be divided by a divorce judgment.
Johnson v. Johnson (1986) Case involving the division of marital assets including the husbands future pension benefits.
Johnson v. Johnson (1997) Case involving property division. A Probate Court judge is not allowed by the law to assign marital property to the children of the parties to a divorce proceeding or to any nonparty third person.
Johnson v. Johnson (2001) Case involving evidence of events occurring subsequent to the divorce during a postremand evidentiary hearing with respect to a division of the marital assets and debts. There was no merit to the contention by the husband in a divorce proceeding that the trial judge abused his discretion in assigning virtually all the marital estate to the wife, including the marital home, which was acquired almost entirely as a gift from the husband's mother.
Kane v. Kane Findings warranted conclusions that a husband had a steady source of income in excess of his admitted salary. His income was sufficient to justify alimony and child support payments in excess of that which would ordinarily be warranted in the circumstances. There was sufficient evidence to substantiate a judgment that upon divorce the wife and children have exclusive use of the marital home pending the occurrence of specified events which would cause the home to be sold, with its net equity to be distributed seventy-five percent to the wife and twenty-five percent to the husband. An award of $15,000 in attorney's fees to the wife's attorney was, in the circumstances, excessive.
Karellas v. Karellas A judgment of divorce nisi, involving a sum of money to be paid to the wife, constituted a "judgment for the payment of money" and under the plain terms of the statute, the monetary award automatically bore interest from the date of the entry of the judgment. The wife, upon the husband's failure to comply with the judgment, was not required to enforce payment of the award and interest by means of a complaint for contempt.
Ketterle v. Ketterle In a dispute about the division of marital assets, the judge accorded greater weight to a statutory factor - the ability to acquire future income and assets - where the husband won a Nobel Prize; likewise, the judge's crediting of the husband with $83,000 in Nobel Prize proceeds which he had promised to his mentor was not clearly erroneous. Although a judge's order that the father pay the college expenses of his three children was premature as to the two youngest children, the judge's reasoning was sound in assigning to the father the responsibility for college expenses of the oldest child, who was a junior in high school at the time of trial.
Kittredge v. Kittredge Division of property case involving a husband who lost money gambling. The court saw no abuse of discretion in a marital property division that, after consideration of all the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, s. 34, awarded the plaintiff wife approximately sixty-four per cent of the marital estate, an amount that enabled her to continue the same comfortable lifestyle she enjoyed throughout the years of her marriage, notwithstanding the husband's extensive gambling, which did not adversely affect the family.
Kuban v. Kuban 48 Mass. App. Ct. 387 (1999). The wife was not entitled to contributions made to the husband's retirement annuities, which were made by the husband's employer after the effective date of the dissolutions of the parties' marriage.
Lauricella v. Lauricella Divorce case involving real estate held in a trust created by the husband´s father. The court remanded the case for further proceedings with respect to the wife's application for an equitable division, including consideration of the propriety of an amendment to the declaration of trust, just days after the wife had filed her complaint for divorce, the effect of which was to reduce the husband's beneficial interest in the trust from one-half to a one-sixth interest.
Levine v. Levine Case involving the assignment of a separate property of one of the parties to the minor child of the parties.
Lyons v. Lyons The husband appealed from certain aspects of the marital property settlement. He also claimed an abuse of discretion for failure to make findings concerning the husband's financial and other contributions to the wife's legal education and for failure to determine the amount of compensation due to the husband for such contributions. Except for the exclusion of an unliquidated contingent fee, the settlement was eminently fair. The court therefore remand the case on the sole issue of equitable division of that asset.
Mahoney v. Mahoney (1997) Divorce proceeding where the judge properly considered the husband's anticipated Social Security benefits in making an equitable distribution of the distributable marital assets. The judge did not err in valuing the marital assets, with the exception of subtracting the full amount of an equity line of credit from the value of the vacation home rather than the amount actually borrowed, and the matter was remanded for recalculation of the marital assets and amendment of the judgment.
Mahoney v. Mahoney In a post divorce civil complaint, the husband alleged that the wife failed to buy out the husband's one-half share of the marital home by June 30, 2003. The wife filed a motion to dismiss stating that the husband did not have a claim under the law. The wife also attached a quitclaim deed dated March 21, 2002 and a canceled check for $16,000 from the wife to the husband dated April 13, 2002 to her motion. At a hearing the facts were heavily disputed; however, there was no evidentiary hearing because the trial judge took the case under advisement. The only evidence before the court were the attachments to the wife's motion. Consequently, the judge held the wife in contempt and denied her motion to dismiss. The wife appealed. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the wife's motion to dismiss because of the factual dispute but vacated the contempt judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the case.
Maze v. Mihalovich After a judgment of divorce has become absolute and property rights have not been previously adjudicated, the Probate Court may assign property pursuant to G. L. c. 208, Section 34.
Moriarty v. Stone: 41 Mass. App. Ct. 151 (1996). The parties co-habited for ten (10) years prior to their marriage, and it was no error by the judge to consider their pre-marital contributions when determining an equitable division under G.L.c. 208, § 34.
Pare v. Pare An appeal from a judgment dividing marital property the case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings, where it appeared that the judge's findings and conclusions concerning the division of the parties' interests in the marital home attached too much importance to the husband's payment of the mortgage and other expenses and not enough significance to the wife´s situation where she was virtually the exclusive caretaker of their minor daughter, and that any appreciation in the value of the home was attributable to rising real estate values generally, rather than to any efforts by the husband. Moreover, further orders were required with respect to the issue of the wife's request that a portion of the husband's proceeds from any sale of the house be set aside for the daughter's past and future support and medical expenses. The court concluded that a probate judge presiding over a divorce proceeding has authority to enter orders that are designed to secure a spouse's duty to provide support or benefits to a minor child of the marriage, and that the decision to enter such orders and the specific form any orders should take, are matters within the judge's broad discretion, to be exercised upon consideration of all relevant circumstances.
Putnam v. Putnam 5 Mass. App. Ct. 10(1977) Division of assets may not be justified purely by bad conduct by one of the parties. All factors under 208 Section 34 must be considered.
Rice v. Rice: 372 Mass. 398, 400 (1977). A party’s estate is defined as “all property to which he holds title, however, acquired.” This allows a judge to assign “to one spouse property of the other whenever and however acquired.”
Robbins v. Robbins The court upheld a division of property made by the judge pursuant to G. L. c. 208, Section 34, on the basis of findings by a master, despite the wife's contention that the award to her was inadequate in view of the husband's substantial assets. In the circumstances, the judge in a divorce action did not abuse his discretion in denying the wife's motion for relief from judgment based on discovery that, in litigation between the Internal Revenue Service and a corporation of which the husband owned 80% of the stock, a settlement favorable to the corporation had been approved. The court set aside an award to the attorney for the wife in a divorce case where there was nothing in the record on which to evaluate the services performed by the attorney.
Ross v. Ross
Salten v. Ackerman The husband appealed a divorce judgment pertaining to the property division (88% of the marital assets were awarded to the wife) and child support (husband was ordered to pay $2,000 per week). This was a 36 year marriage and both parties were attorneys, and worked outside of the home. The parties adopted a child and they agreed with the birth mother that the wife would become a full-time mother after the adoption. The husband earned approximately $400,000 per year as an attorney. The husband became involved with investments in Lithuania and Russia, which proved to financially disastrous to the marital estate. The husband used his own money as well as money from joint accounts, trust funds and his daughter's college savings, which was done without the wife's knowledge. Upon her finding out the wife made an effort to salvage what was left of the marital estate, and rebuild their financial security. During this time the husband took a leave of absence from his law firm, and he was eventually not allowed to come back. The wife eventually filed a complaint for divorce. The court found that the husband lost $1.7 million. The court awarded the wife the majority of the marital assets because of the husband's reckless dissipation of the marital estate without her knowledge. The court found that the husband was not credible. The court considered the factors in c. 208, sec. 34, and an equitable division of property, and did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of divorce was affirmed.
Savides v. Savides: 400 Mass. 250 (1987). After a lengthy separation, it was appropriate for the Court to value the marital assets at the date of separation because the spouse made no further financial contributions to the marriage.
S.L. v. R.L In a divorce action, the judge erred in including, as part of the marital estate subject to division the wife's remainder interest in a trust; however, the judge included in the marital estate the wife's interests in four other trusts, where her future acquisition of those assets was fairly certain; further, the judge permissibly employed the "if and when received" method for distribution of the wife's interests in those four trusts, despite a lack of findings to explain his reasons for choosing such a method, where the present valuation of the wife's interests in those trusts was subject to uncertainty, and would likely exceed by a significant margin the value of all other marital assets. Alimony was awarded to the former wife within the bounds of the judge's discretion.
Tanner v. Tanner Appeals from Probate Court judgments on complaints by both parties for divorce and ordering a division and distribution of property.
Taverna v. Pizzi - On April 3, 1995, the parties were granted a judgment of divorce nisi on their joint petition for divorce. The parties’ separation agreement was incorporated but not merged in the judgment of divorce. Three days after the divorce became final the wife gave birth to a girl. On February 6, 1996, the wife filed a complaint to establish paternity and child support against the husband. The probate judge dismissed the wife’s complaint, and transferred the matter under the original divorce docket. The probate judge modified the divorce judgment and ordered the following: 1) sole legal and physical custody of the child to the wife; 2) child support to be paid by the husband; 3) the husband was required to obtain a life insurance policy naming the child as the beneficiary; 4) the husband shall establish a college fund for the child, and upon turning 23, the child shall receive the remaining balance of the fund; 5) the husband shall convey 50% of his 401K plan to the wife; and 6) the husband shall pay retroactive child support in the amount of $50,000. The husband appealed. The modified judgment was affirmed with the exception of giving the remaining balance of the college fund to the child, and the 50% conveyance of the husband’s 401K account to the wife. The probate judge’s concern was proper in that the child should not have been treated as a child born out of wedlock because the child was born from a legitimate marriage, and the matter should not have been addressed under a complaint to establish paternity. Under the court’s general equity jurisdiction, the judge had the authority to order child support, retroactive child support and order the husband to obtain a life insurance policy to secure his child support obligation. The distribution of the remaining balance of the college fund was an assignment of marital property to a child, which is impermissible, and should be vacated. Lastly, the wife is not entitled to 50% of the husband’s 401K because the parties’ separation agreement was not merged into the judgment of divorce, and was a final division of marital property. Furthermore, the wife did not present evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or otherwise to warrant a modification of the separation agreement.
Vangel v. Martins Complaint for division of marital assets filed in the Worcester Division of the Probate and Family Court Department. A motion for default judgment and a motion to dismiss properly denied by the judge.
Wheeler v. Wheeler The parties in this case had lived together for the first twelve years of the marriage and lived separately for nine years thereafter. When the judge made a division of the marital property erred in failing to take into account the wife's contribution to the marital partnership by her caring for the parties' child during the separation and in allocating to the husband the value of his assets acquired during the separation.
Wilcoz v. Trautz Discussion concerning the validity of agreements between unmarried cohabitants. A contract between two adult unmarried cohabitants was valid and enforceable, where the evidence demonstrated that the principal purpose of the agreement was to clarify the parties' rights with respect to the division of assets acquired during their relationship in the event that they should separate, and not to secure sexual fidelity or sexual services, and where the agreement was otherwise in compliance with the rules of contract law.
Williams v. Massa: (2000) Leading Case on Inherited property
Yacobian v. Yacobian Discussion where the plaintiff, after filing a complaint for divorce brought this action in the Superior Court to set aside as fraudulent certain transfers of real estate. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, recent developments do not support her claim. Judgment affirmed.
Zeh v. Zeh
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